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bstract
In the wake of the financial crisis the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to publicly express support for what have traditionally been
eferred to as ‘capital controls’. This paper empirically examines the extent to which the change in IMF discourse on these matters has resulted in
ignificant changes in actual IMF policy advice. By creating and analyzing a database of IMF Article IV reports, we examine whether the financial
risis had an independent impact on IMF support for capital controls. We find that the IMF’s level of support for capital controls has increased as
 result of the crisis and as the vulnerabilities associated with capital flows accentuate.
 2017 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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.  Introduction
Sometimes financial crises make policy-makers stop and
ethink whether they know what they think they know about
ow economies work and what the proper economic policy
esponses should be to prevent and mitigate such crises. Was
his time different? It has been well established that the Inter-
ational Monetary Fund (IMF) was generally skeptical for the
egulation of cross-border financial flows from the 1980s to the
un up to the global financial crisis (Abdelal, 2007; Chweiroth,
009; Moschella, 2010; Gallagher, 2015).
In the wake of the crisis the IMF surprised many observers by
penly embracing capital controls to both prevent and mitigate
nancial crises. The IMF supported the use of capital controls
n inflows in a number of countries such as Brazil and South
orea (Gallagher, 2015). Most surprising to many was the IMF’s
utright advocacy for the use of capital controls on outflows in
 The authors wish to thank Katherine Gordon, Rie Namiki, Ana Maria Santil-
ana, and!Yangling Yu for coding and background research for this project. The
uthors would also like to thank Vivek Arora, Sarah Sanya, and Joseph JoycePlease cite this article in press as: Gallagher, K.P., Tian, Y., Regulating c
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).celand as part of that country’s post crisis stand-by-agreement
Sigurgeirsdottir and Wade, 2015).
In some ways, advocating for the appropriate use of capital
ontrols is new policy at the IMF. In 2012, the IMF adopted a
new institutional view’ on capital account liberalization and
ontrols that states that capital account liberalization is not
lways optimal and that under certain conditions capital con-
rols on inflows and outflows can be appropriate to prevent and
itigate financial instability (IMF, 2012). This shift has received
 significant amount of attention, however there is yet to be a
igorous account of whether the IMF has put its new words into
ction. This paper sets out to do just that.
.  The  IMF  and  the  capital  account:  a  literature  review
A burgeoning literature has emerged on the role the crisis
layed in the shift of discourse at the IMF on this matter (Grabel,
011; Chweiroth, 2013; Gallagher, 2015). It is clear that the
risis played an independent part in at least accelerating an incre-
ental level of ideational change at the fund on this issue, though
he seeds of change were planted after the wave of crises thatapital flows in emerging markets: The IMF and the global financial
02
her by analyzing the extent to which such changes in discourse
elated to the crisis were also associated with changes in official
MF advice on managing capital flows.
 B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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A strand of theory in the international political economy lit-
rature postulates that during episodes of financial crises, firmly
eld ideas can be challenged by a rival set of ideas about how
conomies work and should be managed. Under the uncertainty
hat is rife in such episodes, certain key agents can be open to
lternative ideas that help manage such uncertainty. The con-
uits for such change can be ‘norm entrepreneurs’ that cultivate
pervasive struggles’ to legitimize previously unaccepted views
Blyth, 2002; Seabrooke, 2007; Schmidt, 2008; Widmaier et al.,
007). In the global uncertainty following the global financial
risis a significant amount of research demonstrates that the IMF
hanged the way it talked about global capital flows and their
enefits and risks.
In the 1990s the IMF underwent a paradigm shift and began
o see capital account liberalization as an optimal policy for
ll countries, and thus saw capital controls as an unadvisable
olicy. Indeed, in the 1990s the IMF went so far as to intro-
uce a formal change to its Articles of Agreement that would
ave mandated open capital accounts for its membership. As a
esult of the financial crises of the 1990s, and actions by the
nited States Congress, that proposal did not come to fruition.
ubsequently, the IMF became more tolerant of the gradual lib-
ralization of the capital account and of temporary, price-based
apital controls as a last resort for emerging market and devel-
ping countries (Independent Evaluation Office, 2005; Abdelal,
007; Chweiroth, 2009; Moschella, 2010).
A significant shift in mainstream economic thinking regard-
ng the regulation of capital flows occurred around the time of
he crisis as well. Mainstream economic thought generally saw
apital account liberalization as an optimal policy in the long
un for all countries and saw the regulation of capital flows as
nherently distortionary from that optimum. Certain strands of
conomics from the Keynes, Minsky, and Lewis traditions had
ong seen the regulation of capital as necessary for maintaining
onetary policy autonomy, preventing financial fragility, and
s levers for structural transformation. These perspectives had
allen out of the mainstream by the 1980s (Gallagher, 2015).
Around the time of the global financial crisis a consensus
mong mainstream began to emerge on both the theory and the
conometric evidence related to capital account liberalization
nd the regulation of capital flows. A number of theorists began
o question the extent to which capital account liberalization is
ptimal, especially in the presence of information externalities.
ccording to this research, externalities are generated by capital
ows because individual investors and borrowers do not know
or ignore) what the effects of their financial decisions will be
n the level of financial stability in a particular nation. This is
 classic market failure argument and calls for a Pigouvian tax
hat will correct for the market failure and make markets work
ore efficiently.
These theoretical breakthroughs were further substantiated
iven that the vast majority of econometric analyses of capi-
al account liberalization find no rigorous link between capitalPlease cite this article in press as: Gallagher, K.P., Tian, Y., Regulating c
crisis. Rev. Dev. Finance (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2017.05.0
ccount liberalization and growth in emerging market and devel-
ping countries. Indeed, the consensus is that liberalization is
ften linked to banking crises (Jeanne et al., 2012). Finally, meta-
eviews of the literature on the effectiveness as capital controls
a
b
T
Zpment Finance xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
ound that capital controls consistently had the desired effects of
heir policy-makers (Magud et al., 2011; Jeanne et al., 2012). An
uthoritative review of the literature on these matters concluded
he following:
“The international community should not seek to promote
totally free trade in assets—even over the long run—because
(as we show in this book) free capital mobility seems to have
little benefit in terms of long-run growth and because there is
a good case to be made for prudential and other non-distortive
capital controls.” (Jeanne et al., 2012: 5).
The IMF took an even larger step in accepting gradual capital
ccount liberalization and the use of capital controls in the wake
f the global financial crisis of 2008. First, it is important to note
hat the crisis was associated with significant surges and sudden
tops in cross-border capital flows as Fig. 1 shows, there was a
udden stop in capital flows to emerging market and developing
ountries as a result of the crisis—with investors flocking to the
safety’ of industrialized markets.
However, as nations such as the United States engaged in
xpansionary monetary policy, investment again began to surge
nto emerging markets. It is under this turbulent period that
hen managing director Dominique Strauss Kahn ignited a sense
f new thinking within the Fund in hopes that it would revive
nterest in the IMF, given that global regard for the institution
ad waned significantly. Norm entrepreneurs within the research
epartment seized that moment and published articles that found
hat those countries that deployed capital controls going into the
risis were among the least hard hit (Ostry et al., 2010). These
ndings were supported and promoted by the managing director
nd led to an eventual official re-evaluation of the IMF position
n capital account liberalization and capital controls.
This re-evaluation was hotly contested within the board of the
MF, with the BRICS countries leading efforts to grant the most
olicy space possible for emerging markets to regulate capital
ows (Chwieroth, 2014; Gallagher, 2015). In December 2012,
MF adopted a ‘New Institutional View’ on capital flow man-
gement (IMF, 2012). In the new view, the IMF now recognizes
hat capital flows carry risks and that the liberalization of capital
ows before nations reach a certain threshold of financial and
nstitutional development can accentuate those risks. The IMF
lso now acknowledges that under certain circumstances, cross-
order capital flows should be regulated to avoid the worst effects
f capital flow surges and sudden stops—and rebrands capital
ontrols as ‘capital flow management measures’ (CFMs). These
enets were incorporated into a Staff Guidance note in 2013 and
ince that time are intended to guide official IMF policy advice
n the matter (Grabel, 2011; Chwieroth, 2014; Gallagher, 2015).
While there is an emerging literature on the extent to which
he IMF has changed its policy and discourse with respect to
anaging capital flows, there is yet systematic research that
uantitatively examines the extent to which the IMF has actually
hanged its policy advice. There is a significant literature thatapital flows in emerging markets: The IMF and the global financial
02
ttempts to quantify the extent to which the IMF has changed its
ehavior in other issues. Vreeland (2003), Pop-Eleches (2008),
hacker (1999), Bird and Rowlands (2009), and Presbitero and
azzaro (2012) have all examined the quantitative determinants
ARTICLE IN PRESS+ModelRDF-94; No. of Pages 12
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flFig. 1. All emerging market:
f IMF lending programs in different settings. There is also one
rticle that empirically examines the relationship between the
MF and policy on capital flows. Joyce and Noy (2008) empiri-
ally examine the extent to which IMF country programs in the
980s and 1990s were associated with policies to liberalize the
apital account. The authors do indeed find evidence that IMF
rograms were correlated with capital account liberalization.
oy and Ramos (2012) examine Article IV reports to identify
hether the IMF has changed its policy advice after the crisis.
or their paper they read 26 reports in 2010 and did not see much
f a change in IMF behavior. In the spirit of Joyce and Noy, our
aper is the first to our knowledge that econometrically exam-
nes the extent to which the IMF has demonstrably changed its
dvisory behavior as manifest in official Article IV reports both
efore and after the global financial crisis.
.  Data  and  methodology
The specific research questions for this paper are: To what
xtent has the IMF changed the way it views capital flows, and to
hat extent has the IMF increased its level of support for capital
ontrols in the wake of the financial crisis? This section of the
aper describes the mechanics of the database that was created
o answer our research question and outlines the econometric
odel and methodology for the research as a whole.
.1.  Database
Our study is based on a unique dataset created from IMF
nnual Article IV reports from 1998 to 2013. We built a database
ocusing on capital flow management and related policies for 31
merging markets covering Asia, Latin America and Caribbean,
urope and Africa. This database includes coding IMF Arti-
le IV Consultation Reports and Public Information Notice as
ell as collecting country-specific macroeconomic data from
he World Bank World Development Indicators database (IMF,
013; World Bank, 20143).Please cite this article in press as: Gallagher, K.P., Tian, Y., Regulating c
crisis. Rev. Dev. Finance (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2017.05.0
Our coding method is derived from the 2005 IMF Evalu-
tion Report prepared by the Independent Evaluation Office
itled The  IMF’s  Approach  to  Capital  Account  Liberalization
3 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20093.
o
e
b
a
i
f capital inflows 1998–2012.
IMF, 2005). In that report, though in a more qualitative man-
er and with a smaller set of countries, the IMF’s Independent
valuation Office (IEO) assessed the level of IMF support for
apital account liberalization and capital controls in the wake of
he financial crises in the 1990s. Juxtaposed with the new data
e derive from IMF Article IV reports, we include macroe-
onomic data such as current account balance, domestic credit
f the banking sector and external debt payments. Overall, our
atabase includes 528 observations of 33 countries in 16 years
1998–2013).
For each Article IV report, we first code the IMF initial diag-
osis by examining whether the IMF deems capital flows as an
rea of concern for a country undergoing an Article IV consul-
ation. Keywords were searched and read for were those such as
capital flow measures,’ ‘capital controls,’ ‘financial stability,’
surge,’ ‘sudden stop,’ ‘unremunerated reserve requirement,’
capital account deficit,’ ‘inflows/outflows,’ ‘exchange rate risk,’
debts denominated in foreign currency,’ and others.
Keywords of a capital flow issues include ‘external shock,’
external instability,’ ‘adverse shocks related to global stress,’
adverse spillovers arising from the global turmoil,’ ‘contagion,’
foreign exchange pressures,’ ‘rising external imbalance’, ‘exter-
al financial environment,’ ‘balance of payment pressure.’
Secondly, we code the IMF’s policy recommendations to
emedy concerns related to capital flows. We code each policy
ecommendation separately, corresponding with the measures
oded by the IEO in their 2005: tighten fiscal policy, exchange
ate flexibility, sterilization/intervention in the currency market,
rade liberalization, tighten prudential regulation, capital flows
anagement/capital controls.
Finally, if the IMF has a policy recommendation with respect
o capital flow management (CFMs) measures or capital con-
rols, we code the IMF’s level of support for such measures. A
ommon response to managing capital flows is to tighten fis-
al policy. Exchange rate flexibility is also advocated by the
MF and others as tool to temper swings in capital flows. A
exible exchange rate can be a shock absorber in the event
f capital inflow surge. For sterilization/intervention in the for-
ign exchange markets, we read for endorsements of a reserve
uild-up, higher reserve levels would help guard against capitalapital flows in emerging markets: The IMF and the global financial
02
ccount shocks, intervention in FX markets to smooth volatil-
ty and enhance liquidity, reserve accumulation, purchases of
oreign exchange.
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gross basis. The banking sector includes monetary authorities
and deposit money banks, as well as other banking institutions
where data are available. Examples of other banking institutions K.P. Gallagher, Y. Tian / Review of D
We also code IMF recommendations with respect to CFMs.
he key words includes: capital controls, capital flow measures,
FM, unremunerated reserve requirement, impact of capital
ontrols/ineffectiveness, capital account regulation of a pruden-
ial nature, and so forth.
There are numerous kinds of CFMs or capital controls, such
s taxes on the inflow or outflow of capital, quantitative mea-
ures on the repatriation of portfolio investments, exit levies,;
rohibition of foreign purchase or holding of domestic assets;
equirements to obtain administrative permission for a foreign
ond issue; minimum maturity period for foreign bond issues;
axes on purchases of domestic assets by foreigners or on invest-
ent income earned by foreigners; reserve requirements on
eposits held by foreigners and others (Gallagher, 2015).
We quantify the level of support for capital controls (or
FMs) into four groups: not  supportive  (phase out controls,
ontrols are ineffective, drawbacks, elimination of controls as
 positive step, negative effects of capital controls), not  men-
ioned, partially  supportive  (management of temporary surge,
ould be an option, part of a transitory response) and fully  sup-
ortive.  We code these as −1, 0, 1, and 2, respectively. See Tian
nd Gallagher (2015) for a fuller discussion of the coding.
.2.  Econometric  methodology
Given the dataset coded from Article IV Reports, we apply
LS regression in a reduced-form econometric model to exam-
ne the extent to which the IMF has changed its diagnoses of
he role of capital flows and whether the IMF has significantly
hanged its level of support for CFMs as a result of the crisis.
hus, our model is built to analyze whether the IMF’s view on
apital flows is affected by the financial crises and the vulnera-
ility of the economy. It also takes the country fixed effect into
onsideration and runs the robust regression on the panel dataset
rom 2000 to 2013.
The reasons for choosing the time period after 2000 in the
egressions are: on one hand, IMF policy response to capital
ows for the 1998–2000 periods is influenced by the Asian
inancial Crises; on the other hand, during the 1998–2000 peri-
ds, most of the data is based on Public Information Notice while
fter 2000 most are full Article IV reports. Thus, to have a more
eliable data information pre and post 2008 Financial Crises, it
akes sense to choose the analysis period after 2000.
.2.1. Model  equations
The research question is to examine the extent to which the
MF policy advice on capital flows after the financial crises. In
ther words, did the 2008 global financial crises change the IMF
nitial diagnosis of capital flows issues for emerging markets?
re the capital flow management measures mentioned more fre-
uently after the crises happened? If the emerging market has a
apital flow issue, how does the IMF’s level of support for CFMs
ary?Please cite this article in press as: Gallagher, K.P., Tian, Y., Regulating c
crisis. Rev. Dev. Finance (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2017.05.0
Based on these research questions, the regression models are
uilt on the following equations in the reduced forms:
MFdiagnosisit =  αit +  βitCrisest +  γitXit +  ∈ it (1)
s
(pment Finance xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
entionCFMit =  αit +  βitCrisest +  γitXit +  ∈ it (2)
evelofsupportit =  αit +  βitCrisest +  γitXit +  ∈ it (3)
IMFdiagnosisit is coded from the Article IV report of country
 at year t on whether there is a mentioned issue of capital flows.
entionCFMit is coded on the appearance of CFMs after there is
n initial diagnosis from the report. Levelofsupportit measures
uantitatively the attitude of IMF towards the CFM policies.
risest is the dummy variable, which takes 1 after 2008.
Xit represents the macroeconomic fundamentals that mea-
ure the capital vulnerability of the emerging markets. Since
ifferent emerging markets have different economic situations,
e include a list of macro fundamental measures as the fixed
ffects in the econometric regression. Our selection of macro
ariables is based on the Economist 2013 Capital Freeze Index
Economist, 20132). We make a modified selection of the vari-
bles and pick first three key elements: current-account balance
s % of GDP (CAB), short-term gross external debt plus exter-
al debt payments as % of foreign-exchange reserves (EDP),
nd domestic banking-sector credit as % of GDP (DBC).
Current-account balance is defined by the sum of the value
f imports of goods and services plus net returns on investments
broad, minus the value of exports of goods and services. When
 country’s current account balance is positive (surplus), the
ountry is a net lender to the rest of the world. When a country’s
urrent account balance is negative (deficit), the country is a net
orrower, making the domestic economy more vulnerable and
ependable on the global economy.
For example, South Africa’s current account deficit is high
elative to that of other EMEs and is financed by relatively
olatile capital inflows. Foreign direct investment has typically
een smaller than in other emerging markets, averaging just over
% of GDP in the past ten years compared to around 3% of GDP
or the median of EMEs. Instead, South Africa has been more
eliant on portfolio flows, which are volatile in comparison to
ther EMEs. There are, nevertheless, other important mitigating
actors. External debt is low (26% of GDP at end-2008), over
0% of which is denominated in rand. Banks, corporations, and
ouseholds have limited foreign currency balance sheet expo-
ure. Capital inflows are predominantly in the form of equity,
nd hence denominated in rand, while the exchange rate floats.
hould capital outflows reemerge, foreign investors would share
he adjustment burden—as they did in late 2008 when the stock
arket declined and the rand depreciated sharply.
External debt is that part of the total debt in a country that is
wed to creditors outside the country. The more debt the country
wes the outside markets, the higher risk the economy bears and
he less reliable the economy is. Domestic credit provided by
he financial sector includes all credit to various sectors on aapital flows in emerging markets: The IMF and the global financial
02
2 The Economist has combined four factors into an index mea-
uring the vulnerability of 26 emerging markets to a capital freeze
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2013/09/daily-chart-3).
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We present summary statistics for the dataset in a flow
chart in Fig. 2. Fig. 3 presents summary statistics for the key
variables used in the analysis. Figs. 4 and 5 demonstrate theK.P. Gallagher, Y. Tian / Review of D
re savings and mortgage loan institutions and building and loan
ssociations. It’s a measure of the health of the banking sector
f the economy and highly related with the vulnerability of the
apital markets.
Here we first use current account balance, domestic banking-
ector credit, and external debt payment separately. Second, we
enerate a composite of these three components called Capi-
al Vulnerability Measure (CVM) following the rule of Capital
reeze Index (CFI). Then use CVM as one single independent
ariable in our regressions. Third, we add the multiplication
erm of the control variables and the crises dummy in the regres-
ion. This aims at investigating the response reasons of the IMF
hanges after the crises.
The regression equation is
it =  αit +  βitCrisest +  γitXit +  δitXit ·  Crisest +  ∈ it (4)
here Yit stands for capital flow diagnosis, CFM mention or
upport for capital controls. δit measures how likely IMF is to
espond to the specific economic indicator Xit with Yit after the
008 crises.
The reason we exclude financial openness (Chinn and Ito,
008) in our measure CVM is that there exists a co-linearity
etween CAB/EDP and financial openness. As a measure of
nancial openness, Chinn–Ito index is a summary of IMF’s ques-
ions on countries about their capital accounts which includes
he current account balance of the country and other related vari-
bles. Without loss of generality, we also adopt the Chinn–Ito
apital openness index separately as an indicator of the econ-
my’s capital openness to see the impacts on IMF’s institutional
iew.
Last but not least, we run the regression for different regions
eparately. We divide the emerging markets into four groups:
merging Asia, emerging Latin America and Caribbean, emerg-
ng Europe and emerging others. Cross-border capital flows are
asier and more frequent inside the group than between groups.
his region separation can be regarded as the regional effects in
apital flow liberalization.
.2.2.  Expected  results
The model is to test whether the crises had an effect on IMF
dvice to emerging markets. If the IMF had changed its advice as
 result of the crisis we would expect to observe more diagnoses
n capital flow issues after 2008 and IMF’s attitudes towards
FMs are more supportive than before. The 2008 global finan-
ial crises have a tremendous influence on the emerging markets,
specially for the cross-border capital flows. IMF’s change in
FM advice will result in significant policy changes in the devel-
ping countries. Our research results are expected to give solid
uantitative evidence on the IMF policy shifts and institutional
iew switches.
The coefficient of Crises measures not only the direction of
he changes but also the magnitude of the effect. We test onPlease cite this article in press as: Gallagher, K.P., Tian, Y., Regulating c
crisis. Rev. Dev. Finance (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2017.05.0
hether it’s significantly different from zero and interpret as a
hift of regime after the crises. A comparison between whether
o include the macro fundamentals is helpful in understanding
hese changes and seeking the underlying mechanism which FFig. 2. Summary statistics of coding on capital flows.
auses these changes. In addition, the decision on the choice of
acroeconomic variables shed light on how different channels
nterrupt with each other and which part affects the cross-border
apital flows more significantly.
Controlling for the vulnerability of the economy improves
he fitness of the model though there is a loss on the num-
er of observations. The more vulnerable the emerging market
s (the larger the Capital Freeze Index), we would expect a
igher chance to be diagnosed of capital flow issues initially,
he less likely there is a mention of CFM due to the instability
f economy. Otherwise, the coefficients of CVM are insignifi-
antly different from zero. The R-square indicates the goodness
o fit of the econometric model. Due to the small size of the
ataset as well as that crises might not be the major reason for
MF’s change in the capital flow issue; we might expect a small
-square.
The regression results will give useful suggestions to analyze
he IMF’s institutional view with respect to the capital flow lib-
ralization policy, taking the economy vulnerability index into
ccount. Volatile international capital flows has cross-border
nancial shocks which influenced the boom-and-bust cycle as
ell as domestic banking credit. It’s necessary to keep a con-
istent record of the capital flow management policies and learn
rom the history lessons after the financial crises.
.  Results
.1.  Summary  statisticsapital flows in emerging markets: The IMF and the global financial
02
ig. 3. Proportions of level of support in terms of total mention of CFMs.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of box distribution of level of support before and after crises.
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TFig. 5. Statistics of level of suppo
evel of supports through a breakdown by region and crises
vent.
An important issue is the representativeness of the sample.
e adopt the country list posted by IMF authority and compare
ur coding statistics with the IMF dataset1 between 1998 and
000. Our dataset mirrors with their summary table by 90%. ThePlease cite this article in press as: Gallagher, K.P., Tian, Y., Regulating c
crisis. Rev. Dev. Finance (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2017.05.0
esults show that our sample is fairly representative in terms of
ll dimensions (country, region and coding criteria).
1 2012 IMF new institutional view, Chapter 4.
o
t
n
i
cregion including all observations.
.1.1.  Flow  chart
Among all 320 available observation of IMF initial diagnosis
uring 2001–2013, 75.6% of Article IV reports mentioned cap-
tal flows as an issue of concern for the country. Besides, CFMs
re a major suggestion as 40.5% of the IMF initial diagnosis.
hough capital flow management is considered to be an issue, it
ften comes along with macro prudential policies and steriliza-
ion/intervention in foreign exchange markets. Therefore, CFM
ot mentioned for a diagnosis is not equivalent to the CFM’sapital flows in emerging markets: The IMF and the global financial
02
neffectiveness but other policies alone can work out during the
urrent period.
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With a mention of CFM, 61 out of 98 cases gain supportive
dvice from the IMF with 3 special cases of fully support. There
re only 8 neutral cases in level of support, which indicates IMF’s
FM policies usually come with a degree of either supportive or
ot supportive. It’s of interest to see the distribution of level of
upport in different years. The changes in the structure of level
f support are signals of IMF’s policy switches therefore help
nderstand the global evolvement of capital flow liberalization.
From Fig. 3, we can summarize that:
 Mention of CFMs (the total number of all IMF initial diagno-
sis with CFM mentioned) became more frequent since 2008.
 The level of support in capital flow liberalization is increasing
tremendously, transferring from not supportive to partially
supportive or even fully supportive.
 Neutral cases, which represent no attitude toward capital flows
given CFM mentioned, are rare. (2002–2004 Chile, 2009
South Africa, 2011 Venezuela).
 The level of support is more relevant after 2010 when the IMF
starts its New Institutional View. Capital controls are open in
2005 and 2012.
The number of countries that have Article IV reports before
nd after crisis has been balanced. Before the crisis, 12.2% of
he countries observed gain partial support for capital controls
rom the IMF, 11.6% of the countries observed gain total sup-
ort, while after the crisis the proportions are 22.3% and 7%
espectively.
Table 1 reports correlation coefficients among different types
f IMF advice on capital flows. To things stand out that our
elevant to this study. First, exchange rate flexibility comes along
ith sterilization/intervention in the FX market and tightening
rudential regulations. Second, mention of CFMs is most related
ith macro prudential regulation policy.
.1.2.  Examples  from  reports
The major concern about the coding process is the difficulty
o narrow down or categorize the IMF’s views as expressed in
rticle IV reports. For example, the report might make a refer-
nce to the “liberalization of the trade and exchange system,”
hich may or may not include capital account liberalization.
n the other hand, the absence of an explicit reference does not
ean that the IMF never expressed a view during the policy
ialog meeting process.
.1.3.  Comparison  between  regions
The evolution of level of support for capital controls varies
y region. Country heterogeneity affects our model and causes
ariation in the results. These countries differ in geographical
egions, income levels, macroeconomic fundamentals, political
ontext, and the size of the country and so on. However, we
otice that the general tendency is of an increase in the level of
upport over years. To see the regional heterogeneity, we carry aPlease cite this article in press as: Gallagher, K.P., Tian, Y., Regulating c
crisis. Rev. Dev. Finance (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2017.05.0
egional analysis of the change in level of support over the years
n depth.
Furthermore, we compare the mean and quarters before and
fter the crisis among different regions. All variables are signif-
t
t
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cantly different before and after the crisis with the exception of
rade liberalization. Moreover, in general all variables are sig-
ificantly different at the 1% level. It would be very interesting
n further research to analyze the reasons behind the changes in
ifferent regions.
Fig. 4 shows the general distribution of level of support
mong different emerging markets. The box boundary represents
he 25 quantiles and 75 quantiles. The lines are the 25%, 50%
nd 75% of the distribution with maximum and minimum value
oints. For emerging Asia, there is a significant spread in level
f support after the crises. Emerging Europe has a significant
hift from not supportive to fully supportive. Emerging Latin
merica markets are comparatively persistent on capital flow
iberalization. Emerging others has mixed issues. All emerging
arkets receive more volatile level of support on capital flows
rom IMF.
We see that the IMF strengthens support for partial control of
apital account significantly after the crisis. There is no substan-
ial adjustment on the level for not supportive, neutral and totally
upportive. However, without controlling for other vulnerability
ndices, it is not safe to claim that the financial crisis alters the
MF’s support level for capital control. It is highly likely that
he IMF changes its policy recommendation for capital controls
ased on the four vulnerability indices we introduced.
Fig. 5 gives a frequency graph of the levels of support. Here
zero” case not only includes a neutral attitude towards the level
f support in capital controls, but also accounts or the cases of
ot mentioning CFMs as well as capital flow not diagnosed as
n issue. We see a larger proportion of capital flow unclearness
n the emerging Latin American and Caribbean. On the contrary,
merging Asia has the highest frequencies in both not supportive
nd supportive categories.
.  Regression  results
.1.  Baseline  model
We first run the simple regression of IMF initial diagnosis
n the Financial Crisis Dummy variable. Results are summa-
ized in Table 2 Panel 1. When we run the simple regression of
MF initial diagnosis on dummy variable, we obtain a positive
nd statistically significant coefficient for the dummy variable.
ithout control for other variables, there is a statistically sig-
ificant change in IMF initial diagnosis due to the 2007–2008
nancial crisis.
However, the conclusion we have reached by just running
he previous regression does not control for any other variable
hat could have an effect on the significance of the “Dummy”.
t may be the case that it is not due to the 2008 financial crisis
tself but to other elements such as the economic fundamentals
f the emerging markets. Therefore, to further understand the
elationship between the crises and IMF initial diagnosis we run
urther regressions.apital flows in emerging markets: The IMF and the global financial
02
As shown in Table 2, even if we control for macro fundamen-
als, which measures the vulnerabilities of the economy, into
he regression, the dummy variable always has a statistically
ignificant and positive impact on the IMF initial diagnosis.
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Table 1
Correlation between different policy suggestions.
Correlation Fiscal policy Exchange rate Sterilization/
intervention
Trade liber-
alization
Macro-
prudential
Tighten fiscal policy 1.0000
Exchange rate flexibility 0.2395 1.0000
Sterilization/intervention 0.0531 0.2788 1.0000
Trade liberalization 0.1018 −0.0494 −0.0774 1.0000
Tighten macroprudential 0.2480 0.2778 0.2375 0.0267 1.0000
Mention of CFMs 0.1131 0.1909 0.1971 0.0820 0.1981
Table 2
Regression results.
Part I: IMF initial diagnosis
Crises (2007) 0.229c 0.250c 0.246c 0.195b 0.188c 0.219c
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.003 −0.003
Domestic banking-sector credit (% of GDP) 0.00028 0.00006
External debt payment (% of foreign-EX reserve) −0.00054 −0.00057
Capital Vulnerability Measurement (normalized) −0.027
Constant 0.697c 0.696c 0.678c 0.806c 0.0668c 0.762c
N 296 282 283 198 198 198
R-squared 0.0785 0.0916 0.0911 0.0882 0.0897 0.0769
Part II: mention of CFMs
Crises (2007) 0.138b 0.147b 0.095a 0.069 0.067 0.106
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.003 −0.002
Domestic banking-sector credit (% of GDP) 0.004c 0.0042c
External debt payment (% of foreign-EX reserve) (−) 0.0009a (−) 0.00057
Capital Vulnerability Measurement (normalized) 0.498c
Constant 0.273c 0.272c −0.113 0.404c 0.0673 0.134b
N 296 282 283 198 198 198
R-squared 0.0209 0.0246 0.1568 0.0335 0.1887 0.0627
Part III: level of support
Crises (2007) 0.227c 0.210b 0.186b 0.154a 0.117 0.142a
Current account balance (% of GDP) (−) 0.003 (−) 0.017b
Domestic banking-sector credit (% of GDP) 0.0037c 0.0043c
External debt payment (% of foreign-EX reserve) 0.00012 0.00025
Capital Vulnerability Measurement (normalized) 0.853c
Constant 0.023 0.025 (−) 0.24c 0.0266 (−) 0.288b (−) 0.263c
N 296 282 283 198 198 198
R-squared 0.0391 0.035 0.1187 0.0164 0.149 0.1234
a
p
p
r
5
c
e
n
f
p
2
c
f
e
d
v
m
M90% confidence interval.
b 95% confidence interval.
c 99% confidence interval.
We plot the baseline regression model of the level of sup-
ort of capital controls for different regions in Fig. 6. There are
ositive trends for emerging Asia and Europe. The gray area
epresents the 90% confidence interval for the slope.
.2.  Including  Capital  Vulnerability  Measures
Our modification of the baseline model includes adding
urrent account balance, domestic banking sector credit andPlease cite this article in press as: Gallagher, K.P., Tian, Y., Regulating c
crisis. Rev. Dev. Finance (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2017.05.0
xternal debt payment ratio separately as well as Capital Vul-
erability Measures. Capital Vulnerability Measure is generated
rom the combination of three variables as discussed in the
revious sector.
p
m
CFirst, IMF’s initial diagnosis changes significantly after the
007 financial crises, with an increase of around 20% on the
ross-border capital flow issues. There is no significant impact
rom the current account balance, domestic banking credit and
xternal debt, neither separate nor simultaneous.
Second, mention of CFMs is significantly correlated with the
omestic banking-sector credit: the higher the credit is, the more
ulnerable the domestic banking sector is, therefore the more
ention of CFMs as a warning advice. The Capital Vulnerability
easure generated from the three variables has a significantapital flows in emerging markets: The IMF and the global financial
02
ositive coefficient, meaning the more vulnerable the emerging
arket is, the higher probability (50% increases) of mentioning
FMs.
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Third, level of support on capital flow liberalization changes
fter the crises, with more supportive arguments mentioned
n the Article IV. The more severe the current account deficit
negative balance), the less supportive IMF is on capital flow
iberalization. What’s more, for the domestic credit from the
anking sector, a high value of domestic credit implies a high
evelopment in capital market together with a high risk of capi-
al vulnerability. In 2013, the country with the highest domestic
redit in the world is Japan with a value of 341.69 while the
owest value in the world is Libya −65.93. We find the posi-
ive relationship between domestic credit and mention of CFMs
ecause a boom in banking credit makes IMF realize that the
ountry needs to restrict inflows. IMF is more cautious to the
apital flows in the emerging markets, valuing domestic credit
s a signal of economy’s vulnerability.
Taking one step further, we generate Capital Vulnerability
easures from previous results and regard it as a general control
ariable of the economy’s vulnerability. In the final regression,
here is a positive correlation between the vulnerability of the
merging market and the supportive attitude of IMF. The more
ulnerable the current economy is, the more changes in IMF’s
evel of support on capital flows management measures. These
hanges can be from not supportive to neutral, from neutral to
artially supportive, or from partially supportive to fully sup-
ortive.
The R-squares of our regression models are low because our
ample is relatively small and has a short time horizon of 12
ears. By adding more control variables, we see an increase
n the model’s goodness to fit. There are two kinds of effectsPlease cite this article in press as: Gallagher, K.P., Tian, Y., Regulating c
crisis. Rev. Dev. Finance (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2017.05.0
y including more control variables: on one hand, it lowers the
egree of freedom of the model; on the other hand, it avoids the
odel misspecification and improves the model explanation.
t
f
o level of support by region.
ore observations would be helpful to better explain the effects
f financial crises on IMF’s view of capital flows.
.3.  Including  financial  openness  alone
Table 3 shows the results of adding financial openness
lone in the regression model. When using Chinn–Ito Capital
penness as the control variable of the underlying economic
undamentals, there is a significant negative effect on both IMF’s
nitial diagnosis and mention of CFMs. The coefficient can be
nterpreted as the influence of capital openness: the higher level
f openness the current emerging market is, the less probabil-
ty it’s diagnosed by IMF with a capital flow issue and the less
ention of CFMs in the IMF Article IV report of the same year.
.4.  Adding  intersections
Beyond our baseline model, we generate five inter-
ection variables by multiplying the controls with the
rises dummy. There are dummycurrentbalance, dummydo-
esticcredit, dummyexternaldebt, dummyfinancialopenness  and
Compositeindex. CCompositeindex  is based on Capital Vul-
erability Measures we created, which is the equally weighted
omposite index of current account balance, external debt and
omestic banking-sector credit. By adding these control  vari-
ble ×  crises  dummy  variables, we expect IMF is more likely to
espond to specific economic indicators with a capital flow diag-
osis, CFM mention as well as support for capital controls afterapital flows in emerging markets: The IMF and the global financial
02
he 2008 crises. There should be a positive significant coefficient
or the intersection variables.
The main purpose of adding the intersection parts is to find
ut how IMF makes changes and adjustments in capital flow
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Table 3
Include Chinn–Ito financial openness only.
IMF initial diagnosis Mention of CFMs Level of support
Crises 0.229*** 0.233*** 0.138** 0.151** 0.226*** 0.141*
Constant 0.697*** 0.794 0.273*** 0.434*** 0.023 0.011
Capital openness −0.189 −0.559*** 0.124
N 296 198 296 198 296 198
R-squared 0.0785 0.0872 0.0209 0.0707 0.0391 0.0182
* 90% confidence interval.
*
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egulations after the 2008 financial crises. As we have already
hown in our quantitative analysis, IMF does change its level of
upport to CFMs after the crises. But what are the key factors
MF’s changes in its initial diagnosis, mention of CFMs and
evel of supports are based on? Which macro indicators influ-
nce IMF’s change most after the crises? Are the changes in
ifferent decisions affects by the same factor significantly and
onsistently?
The results are shown in Table 4. There are some interest-
ng results we found through tens of regressions we run. Most
egressions turn out to be not significant. However, there are
mprovements in the model’s goodness to fit and some of the
esults come out to be exactly the same as our expectation.
We found significant positive response in the financial open-
ess index to IMF’s initial diagnosis after 2008 and negative
or the level of support. There are more IMF initial diagnoses
fter the crises, which, with a higher probability, is due to the
nancial openness of the emerging markets. IMF’s judgment
n capital flows issues is mostly based on countries’ financial
penness. However, the mention of CFMs is more related to the
urrent account balance. Both the external debt and financial
penness have negative influence on IMF’s levels of support to
FMs, which means IMF considers external debt and financial
penness when giving opinions on the policy support.
For mention of CFMs, the current account balance matters
ore for such changes. External debt has a significantly nega-
ive impact on the level of support changes after the crises. The
easure of capital vulnerability matters more for the IMF initial
iagnosis after the crises
In fact, our Capital Vulnerability Measure turns out to offer a
elatively consistent result, the same as what we expected in the
eginning. The rest of the regression results are not significant
rom zero and hard to tell the sign of the coefficients.
.5.  Findings  and  robustness
We can conclude from the regression results that the finan-
ial crisis has a significant influence on the IMF’s decision about
evel of support for capital control after controlling for the vul-
erability measures individually. Domestic credit in the bankingPlease cite this article in press as: Gallagher, K.P., Tian, Y., Regulating c
crisis. Rev. Dev. Finance (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2017.05.0
ector and the CVM index both alter IMF’s support level for
apital control significantly in the expected direction. The pos-
tive coefficient indicates that as the economy becomes more
ulnerable, the level of support for capital control increases.
s
c
rThe result is especially meaningful for emerging market
conomies in Asia, which are mostly under development with
redit issues in the banking sector. Capital flows can be asso-
iated with the domestic intermediary sectors such as banking.
n particular, positive net flows can be used to finance current
ccount deficits. In August 2013, India announced a new capital
ontrol to stop the cash flowing out of the country and to stem
he decline of rupee. Since our regression results show that IMF
as altered its policy recommendation after the financial cri-
is, India’s imposition of the capital control should have gained
upport from IMF.
The coefficient on Capital Vulnerability Measure CVM is
ositive and significant, indicating that the openness of a coun-
ry’s capital account does have an impact on IMF’s altitude about
apital control. However, considering the fact that the Chinn–Ito
ndex is just one method to describe certain facets of a country’s
apital account, we cannot say that in reality the openness of
 country’s capital account has no influence on IMF’s policy
ecommendation.
The coefficient on vulnerability index “Current account bal-
nce” is negative but insignificant, which implies that we cannot
eject the hypothesis that current account balance does not alter
he IMF’s attitude about capital controls. The coefficient on
ulnerability index “External Debt Payment” is negative but
nsignificant, which implies that we cannot reject the hypoth-
sis that the ability of a country to repay its debt does not alter
he IMF’s attitude about capital controls.
The interesting result is that the coefficient on the domestic
anking-sector credit is negative and significant, which means
hat the domestic credit of a country in its banking sector alters
he IMF’s attitude about capital controls after the crisis. After
he crisis, as the domestic banking credit evaluated by World
ank strengthens, the IMF would be more likely to increase its
evel of support for capital controls.
The results are robust and consistent under several modifica-
ions from the baseline model. Adding intersections and more
ontrols improves the model’s goodness to fit. The main results
o not change and the corresponding coefficients remain sig-
ificantly positive. The joint endogenous relationship between
FM mention and levels of support enhances the IMF institu-
ional view changes after the Global Financial Crises. Our resultsapital flows in emerging markets: The IMF and the global financial
02
hed light on the further research on what factors the good indi-
ators of IMF changes are and seeking the underlying economic
easons for emerging market growth.
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Table 4
Add intersections.
IMF initial diagnosis Mention of CFMs Level of support
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Crises 0.208*** 0.134* 0.073 0.198 0.226** 0.273** 0.463
Capital Vulnerability Measure (CVM) −0.341* −0.678** 0.327
Crises*CVM 0.375 0.292 −0.502
Financial openness −0.080*** −0.006
Crises*financial openness 0.070* −0.093*
Current account balance (CAB) 0.005 −0.0159*
Crises*CAB −0.025* −0.0139
Domestic banking credit (DBC) 0.004*** 0.0049***
Crises*DBC −0.000 −0.0014
External debt payment (EDP) −0.0004 0.0005
Crises*EDP −0.002 −0.0042**
R-squared 0.1365 0.0973 0.0745 0.2063 0.0343 0.0264 0.1702
* p < 0.05.
*
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** p < 0.001.
.  Summary  and  conclusions
This paper sought to add to the existing literature on the IMF
nd the capital account by econometrically testing whether the
nancial crisis was linked to a change in IMF policy advice on
hese matters. The IMF underwent a significant re-evaluation of
ts policy on capital account liberalization and the role of capital
ontrols in the wake of the global financial crisis. Previous work
as shown that this shift in thinking at the IMF, albeit an incre-
ental one, was due to a number of factors (Chwieroth, 2010;
allagher, 2014). This paper adds to that literature and finds that
ot only has the IMF changed what its view on capital flows,
here is also evidence that the IMF has also changed its actual
ehavior on these matters as a result of the crisis.
Our results can be summarized as follows.
 The financial crises had a significant impact on IMF diag-
nosis of whether capital flows are a source of vulnerability
in emerging markets. This finding is irrespective of the level
actual capital flow vulnerability in specific economies how-
ever and thus signals an ideational change. 22.9% of more
capital flow diagnosis appears after the crises.
 The IMF is more apt to out rightly discuss CFMs after
the crises, especially when domestic banking sector credit
appears to be concerning. By controlling the vulnerability of
the economy, the effect of crises becomes insignificant. Our
capital vulnerability index has a significant prediction of IMF
mention of CFMs.
 The IMF is more apt to support the use of CFMs after the
crisis, however the level of support changes after the crises
becomes less significant when adding vulnerability controls.
The more vulnerable the emerging market is, the more level of
support on capital flow management measures are imposed.Please cite this article in press as: Gallagher, K.P., Tian, Y., Regulating c
crisis. Rev. Dev. Finance (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2017.05.0
This paper is not the last word on these matters. Our database
ill need to be updated on an. In so doing it will be interesting to
xamine the extent to which the IMF view remains a significant
Momponent of IMF advice as the ‘salience’ of the crisis wanes
n future years. Pagliari (2013) has shown that policy-makers
end to be the most attuning to regulations during and in the
mmediate aftermath of crises but that such attention decreases
s the public and policy-makers move on to other concerns.
eferences
bdelal, R., 2007. Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance. Harvard
University Press.
ird, Graham, Rowlands, D., 2009. A disaggregated empirical analysis of the
determinants of IMF arrangements: does one model fit all? J. Int. Dev. 21
(7), 915–931.
lyth, M., 2002. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional
Change in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press.
hinn, M.D., Ito, H., 2008. A new measure of financial openness. J. Comp.
Policy Anal. 10 (3), 309–322.
hwieroth, Jeffrey M., 2010. Capital Ideas: The IMF and the
Rise of Financial Liberalization. Princeton University Press
http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9087.html.
hwieroth, Jeffrey M., 2014. Controlling capital: the international monetary
fund and transformative incremental change from within international orga-
nizations. New Polit. Econ. 19 (3), 445–469, ISSN 1356-3467.
allagher, Kevin P., 2015. Ruling Capital: Emerging Markets and the Reregu-
lation of Cross-border Finance. Cornell University Press.
rabel, Ilene, 2011. Not your grandfather’s IMF: global crisis, ‘productive inco-
herence’ and developmental policy space. Camb. J. Econ. 35 (5), 805–830.
nternational Monetary Fund, 2005. Report on the Evaluation of the IMF’s
Approach to Capital Account Liberalization. Independent Evaluation Office
of IMF.
nternational Monetary Fund, 2012. The Liberalization and Management of
Capital Flows: An Institutional View, Policy Survey Paper. International
Monetary Fund.
nternational Monetary Fund, 1998–2013. IMF Article IV Consultation Reports
and Public Information.
eanne, Olivier, Subramanian, A., Williamson, J., 2012. Who Needs to Open the
Capital Account? Peterson Institute for International Economics.
oyce, Joseph, Noy, Ilan, 2008. The IMF and the liberalization of capital flows.apital flows in emerging markets: The IMF and the global financial
02
Rev. Int. Econ. 16 (3), 413–430.
agud, N., Reinhart, C., Rogoff, K., 2011. Capital Controls: Myths and Real-
ities, Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
16805.
ARTICLE IN PRESS+ModelRDF-94; No. of Pages 12
1 evelo
M
O
P
P
P
R
S
S
S
T
T
V
bridge University Press.
Widmaier, W.W., Blyth, M., Seabrooke, L., 2007. Exogenous shocks or endoge-2 K.P. Gallagher, Y. Tian / Review of D
oschella, Manuela, 2010. Governing Risk: The IMF and Global Financial
Crises. Palgrave.
stry, J.D., Ghosh, A.R., Habermeier, K., Chamon, M., Qureshi, M.S.,
Reinhardt, D.B.S., 2010. Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls,
IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/04. International Monetary Fund
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1004.pdf.
agliari, Stefano, 2013. Public Salience and International Financial Regulation.
University of Waterloo doctoral dissertation.
op-Eleches, G., 2008. From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in
Latin America and Eastern Europe. Princeton University Press.
resbitero, Andrea F., Zazzaro, A., 2012. IMF lending in times of crisis: political
influences and crisis prevention. World Dev. 40 (10), 1944–1969.
oy, Rathin, Ramos, Raquel Almeida, 2012. IMF Article IV Reports: An Anal-Please cite this article in press as: Gallagher, K.P., Tian, Y., Regulating c
crisis. Rev. Dev. Finance (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2017.05.0
ysis of Policy Recommendations. International Policy Centre for Inclusive
Growth, Brasilia-DF, Brazil.
chmidt, V.A., 2008. Discursive institutionalism: the explanatory power of ideas
and discourse. Polit. Sci. 11 (1), 303.pment Finance xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
eabrooke, L., 2007. Legitimacy gaps in the world economy: explaining the
sources of the IMFs legitimacy crisis. Int. Polit. 442 (3), 250–268.
igurgeirsdottir, Silla, Wade, Robert, 2015. From control by capital to control of
capital: Iceland’s boom and bust, and the IMF’s unorthodox rescue package.
Rev. Int. Polit. Econ. 22 (1), 103–133.
ian, Yuan, Gallagher, Kevin P., 2015. Regulating Capital Flows in Emerging
Markets: the IMF and the Global Financial Crisis, GEGI working paper May
2015.
hacker, Strom C., 1999. The high politics of IMF lending. World Polit. 52 (01),
38–75.
reeland, James Raymond, 2003. The IMF and Economic Development. Cam-apital flows in emerging markets: The IMF and the global financial
02
nous constructions? The meanings of wars and crises. Int. Stud. Q. 51 (4),
747–759.
